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The mainstream model of option pricing is based on an exogenously given process of price movements. The 
implication of this assumption is that price movements are not affected by actions of market participants. However, if 
we assume that there are indeed impacts on the price movements it no longer possible to apply the standard pricing 
models. As a result we need an approach explaining interdependent actions. Game theory is in a position to offer proper 
olutions. This paper applies game theoretic concepts to determine option prices. Consequently, both the option price 
and the underlying´s expiration price are endogenously determined. 
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Traditional option pricing is based on the assumption that risk management is a
single person decision game. Alternatively we can say it is a game against nature.
The idea behind this concept is that price movements are assumed to be governed
by exogenously given event uncertainties. The price movements are independent of
all actions of other decision makers. The consequence is very simple. Because the
outcome is not a®ected by actions of the gamblers it is a simple matter of stochastic
and statistic techniques to calculate the probabilities of potential outcomes. That
is what Markowitz based stochastic risk management is all about.
In 1998 the hedge-fund run by Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) collapsed
or near-collapsed inducing unprecedented activities to prevent a similar event from
happening again. In his Financial Times article "Why risk management is not
rocket science\ Rene Stulz (2000) identi¯es reasons for the LTCM disaster (see
also Stulz (2009)).
In the paper we replace the no-arbitrage equilibrium by a Nash equilibrium. To be
more precise, we consider a European call option for the single period case. The
two players are the seller and the buyer of the option. We are going to show how to
value the call option using a binomial process according to which the underlying
asset's price can take only two values at the expiration date.1
In contrast to the Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) model (in the following CRR),
in our model the two possible expiration date prices are not exogenously given.
The seller sets the expiration prices endogenously according to his strategic goals.
In other words, the seller is representing the market thus giving up the assumption
of exogenously given market prices. On the opposite side of the market, the buyer
is making strategic investment decisions in both the underlying and the ¯nancial
option. In order to determine the outcome of the strategic interaction of the players
the Nash equilibrium is adopted. The Nash equilibrium is the generally accepted
concept when it comes to strategic decision making (Rubinstein (1991)).
1For using game theory to model option pricing from a strategic point of view see for example
Rubinstein (1991), Thakor (1995) and Ziegler (2004).
2In our approach we calculate both the current option price and the future expira-
tion prices of the underlying asset. In the world of gambling, steered by a roulette
wheel, an agent does not have any in°uence on the outcome. A game, de¯ned in a
broadest sense, is more than a game against nature. Brie°y written, a game is any
situation in which players make strategic decisions, i.e., decisions that take into
account each other's actions and responses. In the light of Stultz's statement, we
see clearly: strategic openness is not the same like the openness of roulette games.
Stulz's critique how ¯nance works today is essential, if we see Danielsson (2002),
Jovanovic and Le Gall (2002). In one word, more insight into the real structure
and the real functioning of the ¯nancial market is required.
In our study a simple option pricing game is developed and presented. If the buyer
of a call option bets on what will happen and the seller of a call option decides
what happens, then, without a doubt, insight in the true nature of openness
(risk) is required. Given strategic behavior of both the seller and the buyer of
a call option in the paper two results are presented. Firstly, we show how the
seller's maximum premium is calculated. Secondly, we show that in a speci¯c
strategic setting and in the non-strategic CRR setting, the results are the same,
if the objective probabilities for the sates of the world and the so-called CRR risk
neutral probabilities for the sates of the world are the same.
2 The no-arbitrage equilibrium
A call option is a right to buy one unit of the underlying asset at the strike price
at the expiration date. In economics a right is characterized by a positive price.
What is the market price of the option considered? In this section we brie°y review
the standard approach of option pricing. There are two basic components to be
taken into consideration: the concept of perfect arbitrage and the no arbitrage
principle. This model is used to determine the current option price C. All prices
of the underlying stock are assumed to be publicly known, i.e. the current stock
price S and the future stock price S1.
A simple stochastic process is the binomial process. With the binomial world the
stock price moves up and down over time, but the stock price can take only two
outcomes at t = 1.
S1 =
(
S+ = (1 + u)S
S¡ = (1 + d)S
(1)
3where u = percentage increase (up) of the stock price in t = 1 with u > 0 and
d percentage decrease (down) of the stock price in t = 1 with ¡1 · d < 0. We
assume that the states are known to all participants in the market place.




C+ if S1 = S+
C¡ if S1 = S¡ (2)
The expiration price (2) is the larger of zero and the di®erence between the stock
price at the expirations date and the strike price X
C1 = maxfS1 ¡ X;0g (3)
The basic idea of perfect arbitrage portfolios is as follows: It is possible to compose
a portfolio consisting of the underlying stock and a risk free bond that perfectly
matches the future cash °ows of the option. As a result, in a no arbitrage situation
the option must have the same current price as the arbitrage portfolio. In other
words, a perfect arbitrage portfolio is a com-bination of securities that perfectly
replicates the future cash °ows of the derivative security.
The next step is to calculate the optimal combination of the underlying stock
and the risk free bond in the perfect arbitrage portfolio at t = 0. Assuming a
bond price of one the volume of the bond investment is F and the risk free rate
is r, with u > r > 0 > d. The volume of the stock investment is the product of
the number of stocks Y times the stock price S. The result is SY . In our simple
binomial world, the no arbitrage equilibrium holds if the following conditions are
satis¯ed at t = 1
S
+Y + (1 + r)F = C
+ (4a)
S
¡Y + (1 + r)F = C
¡ (4b)








(1 + d)C+ ¡ (1 + u)C¡
(u ¡ d)
(6)
The present value of (4a) and (4b) is given by
SY + F = C
¤ (7)






















The probabilities (9) and (10) are often called quasi-probabilities or risk neutral
probabilities. For the remainder of the paper without loss of generality S = 1 is
assumed.
3 The non-cooperative equilibrium
This section develops the concept of strategic option pricing. We continue to
consider the case of a call option for a single period horizon as analysed in section
2. However, now the option seller is setting the prices of the underlying in both
states along the lines of strategic reasoning. In addition, we assign probabilities to
the states up and down. The state u occurs with the probability q and the state d
occurs with the probability 1 ¡ q. Again, the risk free rate is r. As an additional
constraint we assume u > r > 0 > d > ¡1.
We consider an individual investor (the buyer) who can choose from two alterna-
tives at t = 0 denoted by (i) B: to buy the stock at the rate r and (ii) NB: not to
buy the stock.
Assuming the outcome in the state u is equal to (1 + u) and in the state d the
outcome is equal to (1 + d) we ¯nd, buying the stock means choosing the lottery
LB = [(u ¡ r);(d ¡ r);q;(1 ¡ q)]. Alternatively, not buying results in choosing a
degenerated lottery with a sure payo® of zero. We assume that the buyer is risk
neutral and, consequently, the buyer is planning to maximize the expected payo®.
Now the seller enters the stage and o®ers the buyer to decide on buying or not
buying the stock when the ¯nancial market state will be disclosed at t = 1. This
5comes to o®ering the buyer a call option with the strike price X = 1 + r. For the
buyer holding this option means being in the situation of the lottery L¤ given by
L
¤ = [(u ¡ r);0;q;(1 ¡ q)]: (11)
We label L¤ the (call) option lottery. What is the maximum premium the buyer
is willing to pay for this option?
First, the prices of the underlying are no more predetermined as the seller is able
to set these prices. In other words, the seller decides what prices the underlying
will take at the expiration date t = 1. We assume that the set of strategies of the
seller, A, is given by
A = fa : maxfr ¡ u;jdj ¡ 1g · a · r ¡ dg (12)
If the seller chooses any a 2 A, then S1, the value of the underlying at the end of
the period, takes on one of the two possible values
S1 =
(
S+(a) = 1 + (u + a)
S¡(a) = 1 + (d + a)
(13)
For keeping our model still simple we only consider a 1-dimensional price strategy
for the seller. A price change speci¯c to each state (u(+) or d(¡)) does not come
under consideration. More formally, in our model the seller only chooses a = a+ =
a¡ instead of a+ = a¡.
There are three possible strategies: The choice of a = 0 means choosing inactivity,
which is the roulette situation. Now, the market exclusively determines the prices
of the underlying in both states.2 Alternatively, a > 0 means the choice of a price
increasing strategy for the underlying. The price of the underlying will be raised
in both states of the market. Finally, a < 0 means the choice of a price reducing
strategy. The price of the underlying will be cut in both states. Condition (12)
prevents negative prices occurring.
By assumption, the buyer cannot observe the seller's choice. Both the buyer and
the seller are assumed to be risk neutral. The seller's expected payo® depends on
which alternative the buyer will choose at t = 0 in the absence of the call option
o®er. The payo® to the seller is assumed to be the di®erence of the expected
value of the call option lottery and the buyer's expected payo® given alternative
2Note that (1) is exactly the special case of (13) with a = 0
6actions. The implicit assumption is that the seller is a premium maximizer. By
our assumption both the seller and the buyer are making simultaneous choices,
i.e. there is no di®erent timing of actions, our model seems to be restrictive.
Nevertheless, we ¯nd a set of application areas, especially in institutional settings,
that are indeed characterized by simultaneous moves. As an example we mention
a call option with credit default swaps (CDS) as the underlying and a strategically
induced reduction of the credit quality caused by the option buyer, e.g., private
equity ¯rms. A more general example for simultaneous moves we refer to the
valuation of strategic investment pattern with the real option theory.
Hence, the expected payo® to the buyer playing her (pure) strategy B (or NB) is
given by
A2(a;B) = q((u + a) ¡ r) + (1 ¡ q)((d + a) ¡ r) (14)
A2(a;NB) = 0: (15)
Referring to the buyer's choice at t = 0 and note that E¤ is the fair value of
L¤ what means that the seller does not o®er L¤ for a price smaller than E¤ the
expected payo® to the seller is given by
A1(a;B) = E
¤ ¡ A2(a;B) (16)
A1(a;NB) = E
¤: (17)
Let the expected payo® of the option lottery L¤ denoted by E¤ , i.e.,
E
¤ = q((u + a) ¡ r) (18)
we obtain
A1(a;B) = (1 ¡ q)(¡r(d + a)) (4)
A1(a;NB) = q((u + a) ¡ r): (5)
We refer to the preceding setting as the one period hypothetical option game with
risk neutral agents. Next, we ask the question: What choice of a 2 A will be made
by the seller when aiming at a maximum premium for the call option?
First, the seller will take into consideration that his choice of increasing or reducing
the price of the underlying will be re°ected by the action the buyer will decide
upon at t = 0 given the choice a. Second, we observe that in equilibrium the buyer
will randomize between her two actions if




7holds true for the exogenously given probability q at the state u.
To explain (21) the line of reasoning is as follows: Suppose to the contrary that
the buyer in equilibrium chooses a pure strategy, that is to say, her equilibrium
choice were either B or NB: (i) say, it were B. In equilibrium, the choice of the
seller must be a best reply to the choice of the buyer. We conclude from (19) that
the seller's choice must be a = jdj ¡ 1 or a = r ¡ u, (ii) now say, the buyer's
equilibrium choice were NB. Then, (20) tells us that the seller's best response is
a = r¡d and (iii) however, in either case it is easy to see that the respective choice
of the buyer is not an optimal answer to that choice of the price of the underlying
of the seller. This, however, must be the case in equilibrium: If, for instance, the
equilibrium choice of the seller was a = jdj ¡ 1 or a = r ¡ u, then the buyer's
best response is, accord-ing to (14) and (15), given by NB. Note that in this case,
according to (14), the buyer's payo® is given by A2(jdj¡1;B) = q(u¡d)¡(1+r) or
A2(r¡u;B) = (1¡q)(d¡u). We conclude that A2(jdj¡1;B) < A2(jdj¡1;NB) or
A2(r¡u;B) < A2(r¡u;NB) must hold true (see (21)). Thus, neither (jdj¡1;B)
nor (r¡u;B) can be an equilibrium. If, on the other hand, the equilibrium choice
of the seller was a = r ¡ d, then the buyer's best response is, according to (14)
and (15), given by B: The payo® to the buyer at NB equals A2(r ¡d;NB). From
(21) we obtain A2(r ¡ d;NB) < A2(r ¡ d;B). Thus (r ¡ d;NB) cannot be an
equilibrium.
As a result, we know that in equilibrium the buyer will employ a mixed strategy.
Each of her alternatives must generate the same payo® to her in equilibrium, for
otherwise she could do better by not randomizing and choosing a pure strategy
instead, that is to say, by choosing either B or NB. Therefore in equilibrium it




with a¤ denoting the seller's equilibrium strategy. From this we obtain
a
¤ = r ¡ (qu + (1 ¡ q)d) (23)
If the seller employs his equilibrium strategy, then the value of the underlying at
the end of the period, S1, takes on one of the following two prices (see (13))
S1 =
(
S+(a¤) = (1 + r) + (1 ¡ q)(u ¡ d)
S¡(a¤) = (1 + r) + q(u ¡ d)
(24)




3See (i) in section 4 that a¤ according to (32) y¤ = q is indeed a best reply for the seller.







¤;B) = q(1 ¡ q)(u ¡ d): (27)




q(1 ¡ q)(u ¡ d): (28)
Now, recall that the quasi-probability in the one period option pricing formula q¤,






The CRR quasi-probability of the single period case, q¤, satis¯es condition (21)
if the borderline case d = ¡1 is excluded. In particular, if the exogenously given










must hold true. Furthermore, the no-arbitrage pricing formula derived in CRR






¤(u ¡ r): (31)
Drawing a comparison with (8), we see that C+ = u ¡ r and C¡ = 0 must be
hold in addition. We obtain the result.
Proposition 1 The strategic option premium of the one period option game
with risk neutral agents equals the single period no-arbitrage (CRR) premium if,
and only if, the exogenously given probability for the state u equals the quasi-
probability in the one period option pricing formula, i.e. Cs = C¤ if and only if
q = q¤.
4 Properties of the solution
The restrictions, made above, keeping in mind in this section we explain details
of the solution. Some of the features are important to the understanding of our
model¶s rationale.
9(i) Recall that the buyer in equilibrium chooses a mixed strategy denoted by
Y ¤ = (y¤;1 ¡ y¤). As the buyer chooses B with the probability y¤ we get
y
¤ = q: (32)
According to maxfr ¡ u;jdj ¡ 1g < a¤ < r ¡ d the seller's equilibrium choice a¤
is an interior solution. A1(a;Y ¤) denotes the expected payo® of the seller given
the mixed strategy of the buyer. Then, observe that @
@aA1(a;Y ¤) is constant and
conclude from @
@aA1(a;Y ¤) = 0 that (32) holds.
(ii) In case 1 > q > (r + 1)=(u ¡ d) and maxfr ¡ u;jdj ¡ 1g = jdj ¡ 1 hold true,
(jdj¡1;B) constitutes a Nash equilibrium. With (19), we see that the seller's best
response to B is a = jdj¡1. Then (14) and (15) tell us that B is the buyer's best
response to jdj¡1 if, and only if, (33) q[(ujdj¡1)¡r]+(1¡q)[(d+jdj¡1)¡r] > 0
holds true. The latter is the case if, and only if, (34) q > (r + 1)=(u ¡ d) holds
true. Equation (34) in particular gives q > q¤ (if d 6= ¡1); the quasi-probability
in the one period option pricing formula by CRR allows of the representation
q¤ = (r ¡ d)=(u ¡ d). However, in general plausible values of r, u and d imply
(r + 1)=(u ¡ d) > 1. Hence, the necessary condition for (jdj ¡ 1;B) being a Nash
equilibrium of the one period hypothetical option game is not satis¯ed. Thus,
condition (21) is not very restrictive.
(iii) In case 1 > q > (r + 1)=(u ¡ d) holds but maxfr ¡ u;jdj ¡ 1g equals r ¡
u (instead of jdj ¡ 1), then neither (r ¡ u;B) nor (r ¡ d;NB) can be a Nash
equilibrium. Again, the equilibrium is given by (a¤;Y ¤) (see (23), (32)).
(iv) Given q ful¯ls (21) we have seen, that Cs = C¤ holds if q equals the risk neutral
probability q¤ (assuming jdj < 1). We distinguish the cases (a) q¤ > :5 and (b)
q¤ < :5. In case (a) we observe that Cs > C¤ holds if, and only if, 1¡q¤ < q < q¤
is valid. In case (b) we obtain Cs > C¤ if, and only if, q¤ < q < 1 ¡ q¤ is true. If
q¤ = :5 holds, we have Cs < C¤ for all q 6= q¤.
(v) Again, q is satisfying (21) is assumed. Given q = q¤ we ¯nd the result q¤ =
0. Intuitively the result can be described as follows: If the exogenously given
expectation of state u is identical with the CRR quasi-probability of state u we
¯nd that the seller is completely passive. He is accepting the exogenously given
expiration date prices without considering any change.
(vi) Like above, q ful¯ls (21) is assumed. The expiration date prices of the underly-
ing are (1+u+a¤) and (1+d+a¤) in u, d. Calculating the CRR quasi-probability,
10~ q¤, we ¯nd ~ q¤ = (r ¡ d ¡ a¤)=(u ¡ d) (see (29)). As a result, we ¯nd the CRR
premium ~ C¤ = q(1 ¡ q)(u ¡ d)=(1 + r) (see (31)). Alternatively, we can say that
the strategic option premium, Cs, is identical with the CRR premium taking care
of the adjusted data situation (see (28)).
(vii) Finally, we would like to emphasize that the above analysis is exclusively ba-
sed on the well known CRR scenario which answers the following question: What
is the maximum premium the option buyer is willing to pay for the call option
in a one period setting? As explained earlier in detail the strategic reformulation
of the CRR model is considering an active option seller who is setting di®erent
outcomes of the states of nature. By assumption both the option buyer and the
option seller make their decisions at the same point of time. Unfortunately, simul-
taneous decision making is not a proper description of the institutional setting of
today's options markets. However, we consider our analysis as a ¯rst step in order
to investigate strategic option pricing.
5 Conclusion
Traditional option pricing is based on the assumption that risk management is a
single person decision game. Alternatively we can say it is a game against nature.
The idea behind this concept is that price movements are assumed to be governed
by exogenously given event uncertainties. The price movements are independent
of all actions of other decision makers. A simple analogy is taken from gambling at
the roulette table: Whatever bets are placed by gamblers there is never any impact
on the outcome of the spin. The consequence is very simple. Because the outcome
is not a®ected by actions of the gamblers it is a simple matter of stochastic and
statistic techniques to calculate the probabilities of potential outcomes. That is
what Markowitz based stochastic risk management is all about.
Of course, there are very sophisticated techniques developed in the recent past
to cope with some new problems. Nevertheless the basic idea is that outcomes
are predictable to a certain degree. In our paper we assume that expiration date
prices are changed as a result of actions of the option sellers. Clearly the option
buyers will take new expectations about these actions into consideration. As a
consequence they will also change their actions. Now it is the option seller's turn
to react one more time. In other words, the uncertainty is strategic in the sense
of the game theoretic approach. We consider the paper as a ¯rst step in the area
11of strategic pricing of derivatives securities. Further research must take di®erent
institutional settings into consideration.
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